7 min read
This post was written with contributions from Chris Caridi and Kat Weinberger.
IBM Security X-Force has been tracking the activity of Black Basta, a new ransomware group that first appeared in April 2022. To date, this group has claimed attribution of 29 different victims across multiple industries using a double extortion strategy where the attackers not only execute ransomware but also steal data and threaten to release it publicly if the ransom demands are not met. The data disclosure element of these attacks takes place on a data leak site available on the Tor network. As a mechanism to apply pressure to coerce the victim to pay the ransom, the operators of Black Basta will gradually release stolen data on the leak site.
The Black Basta group is still in the early stages of their organization and X-Force has not observed any attempts to advertise the malware or hire affiliates on underground forums. Due to operational similarities and the absence of affiliation attempts, it has been reported that Black Basta may potentially be a rebranded version of the Conti gang, a well-known ransomware group that already has affiliates. However, the Conti group announced on May 12 that they had no affiliations with the Black Basta ransomware group. X-Force’s assessment of the possible relationship between these groups is ongoing.
The Black Basta ransomware variant acts at such a high speed that it rarely causes symptoms that would tip off defenders to the compromise before the ransomware has been deployed.
This blog post will detail X-Force’s insights into the Black Basta ransomware, technical analysis of the sample, and indicators of compromise (IoC) to help organizations protect themselves from this malware.
Black Basta’s sudden appearance and subsequent high volume of successful compromises highlights the speed with which ostensibly “new” ransomware groups are able to become central figures in the threat landscape. While this group has yet to be linked by X-Force to existing or past ransomware operations, the impact that this group has had in such a short amount of time points to a practiced and effective set of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that pose a significant threat to enterprise networks. Based on current intelligence, it does not appear that Black Basta targets specific industries or verticals. However, entities that collect large amounts of data that is attractive for extortion operations such as personally identifiable information (PII), financial information, or other sensitive data, are likely to stand out as lucrative targets for attackers.
We encourage security practitioners to review the IBM X-Force Definitive Guide to Ransomware and the mitigations highlighted below, action available IOCs, and ensure that detections are in place to alert on observed malicious behaviors.
Additional Risk Mitigations:
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Behavioral analysis describes the malware behavior observed on a system during execution. Behavioral analysis typically includes actions performed on the system such as files dropped, persistence, details surrounding process execution and any C2 communications. It should be noted that behavioral analysis may not capture all notable malware behavior as certain functions may only be performed by the malware under specific conditions.
Upon execution, the loader base64 decodes a Black Basta payload using the CryptStringToBinaryA() API function. The decoded payload is then RC4 decrypted using the key “1xJr13puJChWqiMeOnFDDSOmoSmws5n“. Black Basta is then injected into a process instance of the loader and executed in memory. The injected Black Basta sample has a SHA256 hash: ef1382770f820e4b2e65981bb7b3a62d5f93e3b87763f83012ef7f7cb1bc9469 and compile time: Thursday, 28.04.2022 15:15:43 UTC.
Upon execution, Black Basta conducts the following activity:
C:\Windows\SysNative\vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet<br /> C:\Windows\System32\vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\Wallpaper = %Temp%\dlaksjdoiwq.jpg
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.basta\DefaultIcon = %Temp%\fkdjsadasd.ico
Your data are stolen and encrypted<br /> The data will be published on TOR website if you do not pay the ransom<br /> You can contact us and decrypt one file for free on this TOR site<br /> (you should download and install TOR browser first <a href="https://torproject.org">https://torproject.org</a>)<br /> hxxps[:]//aazsbsgya565vlu2c6bzy6yfiebkcbtvvcytvolt33s77xypi7nypxyd[.]onion/
Your company id for log in: <varying id per sample in GUID format>
C:\Windows\SysNative\bcdedit.exe /deletevalue safeboot<br /> C:\Windows\System32\bcdedit.exe /deletevalue safeboot
C:\Windows\SysNative\bcdedit.exe /set safeboot network<br /> C:\Windows\System32\bcdedit.exe /set safeboot network<br /> cmd.exe /C shutdown -r -f -t 0
$Recycle.Bin<br /> Windows<br /> boot<br /> readme.txt<br /> dlaksjdoiwq.jpg<br /> NTUSER.DAT<br /> fkdjsadasd.ico<br /> OUT.txtYour company id for log in: <varying id per sample in GUID format>
Static analysis is a deeper dive into the technical analysis of the malware. Static analysis typically includes further details about the functionality, obfuscation or packing in the sample, encryption used by the malware, configuration information or other notable technical detail.
The injection process for the loader is as follows:
Notably, samples similar to loader were found in VirusTotal with the following project paths. The payloads of these samples have not yet been determined.
c4fa34414fb1c199e13d7cd7def0e8f401c9649657a39224bc32310c9fd9d725, C:\BHProject\Treasurer\SharpDepositorCrypter\PELoaderNative\PELoaderNative\Release\PELoaderNative.pdb<br /> f132ffc8648d38833244e612c58224285e85e863a35c872490690217c082e59c, C:\BHProject\Treasurer\SharpDepositorCrypter\PELoaderNative\PELoaderNative\Release\PELoaderNative.pdb
The following samples were compiled under a similar project path but are coded differently.
19c2710e498d55f2e3a3d4126064e960058e32c99dc35944b3fc09aa0eec4754, C:\BHProject\Treasurer\SharpDepositorCrypter\PELoader\PELoader\Release\PELoader.pdb<br /> c5fcd0643823082941bc827613baf0fa574ffd9cb03a8b265d62d657367b2ea2, C:\BHProject\Treasurer\SharpDepositorCrypter\PELoader\PELoader\Release\PELoader.pdb<br /> daa049b15bb5c1d0aef06276f9940d2fea76242f1a01ebfe299a63b7c74f7ea0, C:\BHProject\Treasurer\SharpDepositorCrypter\PELoader\PELoader\Release\PELoader.pdb
To start encrypting files, Black Basta calls the FindFirstVolumeW() and FindNextVolumeW() functions to enumerate volumes on the victim system. For each volume, the ransomware calls GetVolumePathNamesForVolumeNameW() to obtain a list of drive letters and mounted folder paths for the specified volume. Analysis indicates that Black Basta uses ChaCha20 encryption during the encryption process. Notably, it is observed that some files are not fully encrypted, possibly in an effort to hasten the encryption process. Black Basta encrypts some files in 64-byte blocks every 128 bytes as shown in the example encrypted notepad.exe file below.
The samples’ compile times range from February 2022 to Apr 2022. The earlier samples in February contain a ransom note indicating the malware name is “no_name_software“.
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Sample Ransom Note from versions compiled in February:
All of your files are currently encrypted by no_name_software.<br /> These files cannot be recovered by any means without contacting our team directly.<br /> DON'T TRY TO RECOVER your data by yourselves. Any attempt to recover your data (including the usage of the additional recovery software) can damage your files. However,<br /> if you want to try - we recommend choosing the data of the lowest value.<br /> DON'T TRY TO IGNORE us. We've downloaded a pack of your internal data and are ready to publish it on our news website if you do not respond. <br /> So it will be better for both sides if you contact us as soon as possible.<br /> DON'T TRY TO CONTACT feds or any recovery companies. <br /> We have our informants in these structures, so any of your complaints will be immediately directed to us. <br /> So if you will hire any recovery company for negotiations or send requests to the police/FBI/investigators, we will consider this as a hostile intent and initiate the publication of whole compromised data immediately.<br /> DON'T move or rename your files. These parameters can be used for encryption/decryption process.<br /> To prove that we REALLY CAN get your data back - we offer you to decrypt two random files completely free of charge.<br /> You can contact our team directly for further instructions through our website :<br /> TOR VERSION :<br /> (you should download and install TOR browser first https://torproject.org)<br /> https://aazsbsgya565vlu2c6bzy6yfiebkcbtvvcytvolt33s77xypi7nypxyd.onion:80/<br /> Your company id for log in: c98fa42b-3233-45df-bd7c-42529c44cb70<br /> Your company key: 3 of any of your dc through comma. Example: "DC1, DC2, DC3". You can type less if you have no enough<br /> YOU SHOULD BE AWARE!<br /> We will speak only with an authorized person. It can be the CEO, top management, etc. <br /> In case you are not such a person - DON'T CONTACT US! Your decisions and action can result in serious harm to your company! <br /> Inform your supervisors and stay calm!
String analysis reveals misspelled strings “ERRRRRRRROr” and “ERRRROR“.
The ransomware contains references to the following Windows services:
tokenbroker<br /> cdpsvc<br /> wcmsvc<br /> wsearch<br /> dnscache<br /> iphlpsvc<br /> appinfo<br /> coremessagingregistrar<br /> lsm<br /> vboxservice<br /> brokerinfrastructure<br /> camsvc<br /> keyiso<br /> eventsystem<br /> dcomlaunch<br /> power<br /> samss<br /> lanmanserver<br /> comsysapp<br /> vaultsvc<br /> wuauserv<br /> netsvcs<br /> remoteregistry<br /> sessionenv<br /> termservice<br /> netlogon
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